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Abstract
This paper draws on a comprehensive data set from Portugal to investigate the ac-
tivities, internal characteristics and survival prospects of cooperatives and capitalist en-
terprises. Consistent with theory, high levels of market concentration and low entry
costs were shown to be conducive to cooperatives. Cooperatives were found to be, on
average, older and to operate with a larger, more highly educated and more productive
labour forces than their capitalist counterparts. Finally, we show that cooperatives have a
markedly higher probability of survival than capitalist enterprises, even after controlling
for industry and rm characteristics.
JEL Classication: J54, P12
Keywords: Cooperatives; capitalist rms; rm ownership
We thank the Ministério do Trabalho e da Solidariedade Social for allowing access to data from the
Quadros de Pessoal. We are also grateful to the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology and
Santander for nancial support. The support from the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology
was provided through the Programa Operacional Temático Factores de Competitividade (COMPETE) of the
Quadro Comunitário de Apoio III, which is partially funded by FEDER.
yCorresponding author. Department of Economics and NIPE, School of Economics and Management,
University of Minho, Campus de Gualtar, 4710-057 Braga, Portugal. E-mail: n.monteiro@eeg.uminho.pt
zEconomics Division, University of Southampton, UK. E-mail: gs@soton.ac.uk
1
1 Introduction
A long-standing and fundamental question in economics is why rms in market economies are
typically owned by the suppliers of capital. Interest in this question, and rm ownership more
generally, has increased in recent years as a result of developments in the theory of the rm,
the recognition that, notwithstanding the predominance of investor-owned enterprises, alter-
native organisational forms are present in signicant numbers, and indications that advances
in technology are leading to fundamental changes in the organisation of production.1
In this paper we focus on cooperatives as an alternative to investor ownership. Cooper-
atives, as Hansmann (1999) points out, are a relatively new form of organisation - having
emerged as recently as the latter half of the nineteenth century - but now have a signicant
economic presence. Notable contemporary examples include Associated Press and Visa -
both of which are owned by consumers (media organisations and banks, respectively), the
worker-owned cooperatives clustered around the town of Mondragon in the Basque region
of Spain, which accounted for 8% of Basque industrial gross value added in 2008, and the
farmer-owned cooperatives which are responsible for the marketing of substantial portions of
agricultural output in many countries.
The question of why some rms are organised as cooperatives whilst others are investor
owned has attracted the attention of theorists, with prominent hypotheses emphasising the
roles of market power, risk, preference heterogeneity, access to nance and interpersonal
trust (see, for example, Hansmann, 2012 and Hart and Moore, 1996).2 With the exception of
Jones and Kalmis (2009) analysis of the implications of geographical variations in the level
of trust, econometric evidence is conned to a small number of studies focussing specically
on worker cooperatives.3 There is a scarcity even of basic comparative information on the
characteristics and performance of the two types of organisation, with empirical evidence
largely conned to informal analyses of particular markets (for example, Hansmann, 2012
on electricity distribution cooperatives in the US and Hart and Moore, 1996 on securities
exchange cooperatives).
In this paper we draw on a comprehensive data set from Portugal to make three contri-
butions to the empirical literature. First, we investigate the patterns of activity undertaken
1See, for example, Baker and Hubbard (2004) on the impact of computers on the ownership of assets in the
trucking industry, Hart and Moore (1996) on changes in the ownership of securities exchanges and Morrison
and Wilhelm (2008) on the demise of partnerships in investment banking.
2Whilst we are not aware of a formal theoretical model linking cooperative activity to levels of interpersonal
trust, Jones and Kalmi (2009) cite a number of papers that provide arguments suggesting the existence of
such a link.
3Recent comparative studies involving worker cooperatives include Arando et al. (2012), Pérotin (2006)
and Podivinsky and Stewart (2012).
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by cooperatives and investor-owned ("capitalist") rms, and test the hypotheses that coop-
eratives are attracted to sectors characterised by high levels of market power and low risk.
Second, we present ndings on the scale of operation and internal characteristics of cooper-
atives and capitalist rms and test for di¤erences across the two types of enterprise. Third,
we examine the lifespans of the two types of organisation and, using a multivariate hazard
model, test whether there is a di¤erence in their probability of survival.
Our data set - the Portuguese Quadros de Pessoal - has a number of attractive features
in the present context.4 First, it is a census of virtually all rms in the economy. Second, the
Portuguese framework of commercial law specically includes a cooperative legal form the
Código Cooperativo- and such rms can, along with capitalist rms, be identied in the
Quadros de Pessoal. This allows the two types of enterprise to be examined under a common
framework, with variables being dened and collected in a consistent manner. Third, it
provides detailed internal information on each rm including the date of constitution, mode
of formation and demise, industry of operation, and accurate measures of rm size. Finally,
the data extend over a 13 year period from 1995 to 2007, during the course of which the fate
of individual rms can be tracked.5
Our analysis reveals the presence of cooperatives in most sectors of the economy but also
that their distribution across industries di¤ers markedly from that of capitalist rms. The
arguments of Hansmann (1996) and Hart and Moore (1996) that market power is conducive
to cooperatives receives strong econometric support, as does the hypothesis that cooperatives
o¤er less protection against risk in the form of sunk entry costs. Demand volatility, on the
other hand, is revealed not be a deterrent to cooperatives. With regard to internal charac-
teristics, cooperatives were found to operate with a larger, more highly educated and more
productive labour forces than their capitalist counterparts. Finally, we show that coopera-
tives have a higher probability of survival than capitalist enterprises, even after controlling
for industry and rm characteristics.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section provides a denition
of both cooperatives and capitalist modes of production, and describes the data. Section 3
investigates the industry distribution and internal characteristics of each type of rm. Our
ndings on survival are presented in Section 4 and a concluding section then completes the
paper.
4The Quadros de Pessoal has been used extensively for the analysis of rms in aggregate but not, as far
as we are aware, cooperatives.
5The period was chosen on grounds of consistency of the industrial classication (CAE Rev. 2.1).
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2 Denitions and data
A satisfactory comparative analysis of cooperative and capitalist production requires, rst of
all, a precise theoretical distinction between the two organisational forms and, second, a close
correspondence between these theoretical entities and the types of enterprise identiable in
the data.
Following a framework suggested by Grossman, Hart and Moore, the organisational form
of an enterprise can be dened in terms of the ownership of - and thereby the residual rights
of control over - its non-human assets (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart, 1995; Hart and
Moore, 1990, 1996). Whilst, in principle, a particular rm might be owned by anyone, in
practice, as Hansmann (1996) points out, ownership is generally assigned to parties that have
a transactional relationship with the rm, either as suppliers of an input or as consumers of its
output. The former category can usefully be divided into three groups: suppliers of nancial
capital; suppliers of labour; and suppliers of any other inputs such as raw materials.
A capitalist rm can then be dened as an enterprise in which the rights to residual control
are assigned to the suppliers of nancial capital, and in proportion to the amount of capital
supplied. These control rights would typically cover matters such as the choice of products
and prices, and decisions on employment and investment. In practice, such rights might be
exercised directly or indirectly through the appointment of specialist managers. In the latter
case, the owners retain ultimate control through their right to dismiss the management.
In this framework, a cooperative can be dened as an enterprise in which the rights to
residual control are assigned to one of the other (i.e. other than capital suppliers) contracting
parties, and in which these "members" exercise control on the basis of one-member, one-vote.
Once again, decision-making might be delegated to specialist managers.
Our data are derived from the Quadros de Pessoal, an annual survey produced by the
Portuguese Ministry of Labour and Social Security. All rms that have one or more wage
earners are included in the survey with the exception of rms engaged in certain aspects
of public administration and domestic work. As mentioned earlier, the Quadros de Pessoal
classies rms according to their legal form, which enables us to identify both cooperative
and capitalist rms.
Under Portuguese commercial law, the rules governing the operation of cooperatives are
set out in Article 3 of the Código Cooperativo, which draw on principles set down by
the International Co-operative Alliance. Two of these principles, concerning democratic
managementand autonomy and independence indicate a close correspondence with the
above theoretical denition of a cooperative. On the issue of democratic management, the
Código states: The co-operatives are democratic organizations managed by their members,
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which actively participate in the formularization of policies and in making decisions. The
men and women who exert their functions as representatives are responsible to the members
who elected them. In the co-operatives of the rst degree, the members have equal rights
to vote (one member, one vote), and co-operatives of other degrees are also organized in a
democratic form.On the matter of autonomy and independence, the Código requires that
if a cooperative were to seek external capital then it must do so in a manner that maintains
its autonomy as a cooperative.
In addition to cooperatives, no fewer than 39 alternative organisational forms are identied
in the Quadros de Pessoal. However, the vast majority of enterprises (97%) fall into one of
just three categories: sole proprietorship (Pessoa em nome singular ou empresário em nome
individual), private limited liability company (Sociedade por Quotas) and public limited
liability company (Sociedade anónima). Each of these three organisational forms can be
considered a capitalist enterprise on the above denition. Thus a sole proprietorship, in
which the ownership of assets and ultimate control rests in the hands of a single individual,
is the classic capitalist rm of Alchian and Demsetz (1972). In limited liability companies,
whether private or public, ultimate control rests in the hands of shareholders on the principle
of one-share-one-vote. The shareholders are capital suppliers in the sense that they are
entitled to the residual proceeds from the sale of the assets should the rm be liquidated.
Thus such enterprises also correspond to the denition of a capitalist enterprise.
The Quadros de Pessoal excludes any organisation which does not employ at least one
worker. To clean the data, we removed any rm (whether cooperative or capitalist rm) which
reported zero revenue in all periods. We also excluded all enterprises engaged in agriculture,
hunting, forestry or shing on the grounds that there is general acceptance among users of
the Quadros de Pessoal that these sectors are characterised by under-reporting.6 Finally, we
paid careful attention to a rms legal status. In some instances a rm was present in the
data at dates t and t + k but absent in between. Such rms were retained provided their
status at t and t+ k was the same. All other rms were checked for consistency of status. If
a rms status was missing in one or more years then, provided it was constant in the other
years, the missing entries were imputed.7
6Specically, we exluded enterprises in Sections A and B of the NACE Industrial Classication (Rev.1.1).
7A number of rms changed their legal status more than once. It is possible that this might indicate a
classication error and thus all results were checked for robustness to the exclusion of these rms.
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3 Industry distributions and rm characteristics
In this section we investigate the types of activity undertaken by cooperatives and capitalist
rms, and examine their internal characteristics. We test for di¤erences across the two types
of rm in these dimensions and investigate whether the industrial distribution of cooperatives
is consistent with theoretical arguments in the literature. We begin with a brief review of
these arguments.
3.1 Theoretical background: implications of ownership structure
The theoretical literature has identied a number of potential links between a rms ownership
structure and its behaviour and performance.8 Here we restrict attention to arguments that
can be addressed using our data set.
One long-standing argument is that due to the inherent divisibility of nancial capital,
investors in a capitalist enterprise are more able to spread risks than are the members of a co-
operative. Thus, in the specic context of worker cooperatives, Meade (1972) wrote: While
property owners can spread their risks by putting small bits of their property into a large
number of concerns, a worker cannot put small bits of e¤ort into a large number of di¤erent
jobsand thus we are likely to nd cooperative structures in lines of activity in which the
risk is not too great (p. 426).9 Meades argument can be applied to cooperatives more
generally since, as Hansmann (1999, 2012) points out, cooperative members frequently have
a greater proportion of transactions, relative to their wealth, tied to a single rm than do
investors in capitalist rms. However, Hansmann also points to situations where ownership
enables individuals to hedge risks. In such circumstances, cooperatives might have compa-
rable risk-spreading properties to capitalist enterprises. Housing cooperatives, Hansmann
(2012) suggests, are a case in point.
Two further arguments that have frequently been advanced to explain why cooperatives
are far less numerous than capitalist rms are rst, that they are more susceptible to problems
associated with collective governance and second, that they face particular di¢ culties in
raising external nance. On the former, Dow and Skillman (2007) and Hart and Moore
(1996) present models in which cooperative members exhibit a greater degree of preference
heterogeneity than investors in capitalist rms and, as a result, experience ine¢ ciencies in
8See Hansmann (1996), the conributions by Grossman, Hart and Moore cited above and, for the specic
case of worker cooperatives, Dow (2003).
9Podivinsky and Stewart (2007 and 2012) found that risk, measured by the variance of industry prot,
acted as a barrier to worker cooperative entry into UK manufacturing industries. Dong and Bowles (2002)
found that risk played an important role in workersdecisions on whether to buy shares in privatised Chinese
enterprises.
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decision-taking. Hansmann (2012) similarly emphasises this issue and, as an illustration,
points out that agricultural marketing cooperatives typically deal with just one type of crop.
The basis of the nance argument is simply that in the presence of adverse selection or
moral hazard, agents will be reluctant to lend money to organisations in which they are
unable to exercise any control. Cooperatives, by virtue of the fact that control is exercised
by members other than suppliers of capital, will then face a higher cost of external capital.
Indeed, in the specic case of worker cooperatives Vanek (1977) has argued that the problems
associated with nance are so serious that they o¤er an ample explanation of the comparative
failure of these forms in history, ever since they were rst conceived of by the writers of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries(1977, p. 187).10
The nal potential determinant of the pattern of cooperative activity that we consider
is market power. Hansmann (2012) argues that many producer and consumer cooperatives
have been established in situations where their members would otherwise have been exposed
to monopsony or monopoly power. As examples, he cites the agricultural marketing and
electricity distribution cooperatives in the US. Hart and Moore (1996) present a formal model
in which the e¢ ciency of cooperatives relative to investor-ownership is shown to be inversely
related to the degree of competition. In line with the model, they suggest that increasing
competition is one of the factors behind proposals to reform the structure of some securities
exchanges in the direction of outside ownership.11
3.2 Basic data on industry distributions and rm characteristics
We begin by examining the pattern of activities undertaken by cooperatives and capitalist
rms (CFs), rst at the broad sectoral level and then in more detail for manufacturing and
services.12 Table 1 shows the numbers and proportions of rms of each type, averaged over
the period 1995-2007, in each of the major sectors of the economy, and also the ratio of
cooperatives to total rms in each sector. As noted above, the agriculture, forestry, hunting
and shing sectors are excluded from the comparison.13
10Podivinsky and Stewart (2007 and 2012) found that high levels of capital intensity acted as a barrier to
worker cooperative entry into UK manufacturing industries.
11 In their model, an increase in competition constrains the ability of a prot-maximising outside owner to
raise price above marginal cost, but may have no e¤ect on a consumer cooperatives pricing decision.
12For some historical background of the cooperative sector in Portugal, see Fernandes (2006).
13Firms are classied according to the Portuguese CAE (Rev.2.1) system of industrial classication which
is equivalent to NACE (Rev.1.1).
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Table 1: Broad average industry distribution of rms, 1995-2007
Coops. CFs Coops./Total
No. % No. % %
Mining and quarrying 1 0.09 887 0.37 0.11
Manufacturing 215 19.42 41,658 17.38 0.51
Electricity, gas and water 7 0.65 102 0.04 6.81
Construction 64 5.78 34,946 14.58 0.18
Services 817 74.06 162,064 67.62 0.51
Total 1,106 100.00 239,657 100.00 0.46
The table reveals, rst of all, that services was by far the major area of activity for rms
of both types. Almost three-quarters of cooperatives and around two-thirds of capitalist rms
were to be found in the service sector. The next most important areas were manufacturing,
which accounted for approximately 19% of cooperatives and 17% of capitalist rms, and
construction for which the respective gures were 6% and 15%. The remaining sectors -
mining and quarrying and electricity, gas and water - together accounted for less than 1% of
rms of each type. It can thus be seen that, in comparison with investor-owned enterprises,
cooperatives were overrepresented in services and manufacturing, and underrepresented in
construction. A Pearson Chi-square test revealed that the overall pattern of activity of
cooperatives and capitalist enterprises was signicantly di¤erent at the 1% level.
Table 2 presents more detailed information on the manufacturing sector.
Table 2: Average distribution (over time) of rms within Manufacturing, 1995-2007
Coops. CFs Coops./Total
No. % No. % %
Food, beverages and tobacco 151 70.55 4,974 11.94 2.97
Clothing, textiles and leather 12 5.66 10,300 24.72 0.12
Wood and furniture 2 1.04 4,235 10.17 0.05
Printing and publishing 22 10.39 2,750 6.60 0.82
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 3 1.47 1,437 3.45 0.23
Glass and ceramics 3 1.40 3,087 7.41 0.10
Mechanical and metal products 9 4.12 8,721 20.93 0.11
Electrical and electronics 4 1.72 1,490 3.58 0.24
Other 8 3.65 4,665 11.20 0.16
Total 215 100.00 41,658 100.00 0.51
The table reveals a very high degree of concentration of cooperative activity, with some
70% of rms operating in the food, beverages and tobacco sector, and 10% printing and
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publishing.14 A further 6% were engaged in the manufacture of clothing, textiles and leather
and 4% in mechanical and metal products. Whilst we are unable to distinguish di¤erent
types of cooperative within our data, we note in passing that both printing and publishing
and clothing, textiles and leather have previously been identied as important areas of activity
for worker cooperatives (see, for example, Ben-Ner, 1988a).
The distribution of capitalist enterprises within manufacturing is quite di¤erent to that
of cooperatives. Most noticeably, only 12% of the former were engaged in the production
of food, beverages and tobacco, whereas clothing, leather and textiles and mechanical and
metal products each accounted for more than 20% of rms. In broad terms, it can be
seen that capitalist rms were more evenly spread than cooperatives across the spectrum of
manufacturing. A Pearson Chi-square test conrmed, once again, that the two distributions
are signicantly di¤erent at the 1% level.
Information on the service sector is presented in Table 3.
Table 3: Average distribution (over time) of rms within Services, 1995-2007
Coops. CFs Coops./Total
No. % No. % %
Wholesale, retail and repairs 328 40.02 80,269 49.53 0.41
Hotels and restaurants 13 1.61 28,706 17.71 0.41
Transport and communications 40 4.90 9,975 6.15 2.59
Finance 99 11.29 1,420 0.88 27.15
Real estate 92 11.29 23,304 14.38 2.65
Public administration and defense 1 0.07 1 0.00 50.00
Education 97 11.81 2,243 1.38 4.23
Health and social work 37 4.57 7,322 5.44 0.47
Other 111 13.62 8,824 5.44 0.51
Total 819 100.00 162,064 100.00 0.42
Cooperatives were found to be active in all subsectors, with the main concentrations
being in wholesale, retail and repairs (40%), education (12%), nance (11%), and real estate
(11%).15 Once again, capitalist rms exhibit a noticeably di¤erent pattern of activity, with
a higher proportion of rms engaged in wholesale, retail and repairs (50%) and in hotels and
restaurants (18%), and a lower proportion in education (1%) and nance (1%).
These di¤erences in the patterns of activity within the service sector are, as was the
case with manufacturing and the broad sectoral distribution, statistically signicant at the
14A more detailed breakdown revealed that no cooperatives were engaged in the production of tobacco
products.
15The "other" category includes, among other activities: arts, entertainment and recreation, repair of
household goods and various personal services.
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1% level. In Section 3.3 we will investigate the relationship between organisational form,
industry characteristics and internal rm attributes within a multivariate framework. In the
remainder of this section we discuss the selection and construction of the industry variables
and present summary data on both industry and rm characteristics.
Our brief review of the theoretical literature pointed to market power, risk, and the costs
of external nance and collective governance as potential determinants of the pattern of
cooperative activity.
To capture variations in market power we employ the Herndahl-Hirschman Index of
market concentration, dened - as with the other industry variables below - at the 5 digit
CAE (4 digit NACE) level.
We consider two measures of the risk associated with entering a particular line of activity.
First, we construct a measure of demand volatility recently proposed by Cuñat and Merlitz
(2012) in their analysis of the implications of volatility and labour market exibility for
comparative advantage. The variable is constructed by rst determining, for each rm,
the standard deviation of the annual growth rate of its sales, the latter being measured by
the year-di¤erence in sales. The volatility measure, V olatility, is then calculated as the
employment-weighted average of these standard deviations across all rms in the industry.
This measure, as Cuñat and Merlitz point out, is una¤ected by any trend growth in rms
sales.16
Second, we employ a proxy for the sunk costs of entry and exit based on observed industry
entry and exit rates. This approach has been used in the literature on entry and survival by,
for example, Mata and Machado (1996) and more recently, Bernard and Jensen (2007). The
premise is that, in steady state, entry and exit rates will covary with the level of sunk costs.
Following Bernard and Jensen (2007), we utilize the following proxy which allows for the fact
that industries might not be in equilibrium:
Entry costss;t = 1  fmin (Entrys;t; Exits;t)g
where Entrys;t is the industry entry rate dened as the number of rms entering the
industry during the period t  1 to t divided by the total stock of rms at time t. Similarly,
Exits;t is the industry exit rate dened as the number of rms exiting the industry during
the period t to t+ 1 divided by the total stock of rms at time t.
We are not able to address the governance or nance arguments directly, nor do we have
16 In line with the procedure adopted by Cuñat and Merlitz, we excluded any observation for which the
absolute value of the growth rate exceeded 300%.
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data on industry capital requirements. However, both arguments carry the suggestion that
cooperatives might be more constrained in their scale of operation than capitalist rms, and
we are able to examine the size distribution of each type of rm and to test whether minimum
e¢ cient scale a¤ects the pattern of cooperative activity. Following Tsoukas (2011), minimum
e¢ cient scale, MES, is proxied by the log of the median output in each sector.
Table 4 presents the mean values of each of these industry variables, together with the
means of a set of internal rm attributes, for each enterprise type.
Table 4: Summary statistics, 1995-2007
Variables Coops. CFs Observations p-value
Industry characteristics
Volatility 0.54 0.47 3,129,909 0.000
Entry costs 0.77 0.78 3,129,909 0.000
Concentration (HHI) 0.08 0.03 3,129,909 0.000
log of MES 12.36 11.77 3,129,909 0.000
Firm characteristics
log of size (employment) 2.15 1.31 3,129,909 0.000
Age 25.57 8.63 3,129,909 0.000
log of labour productivity 11.04 10.67 2,825,978 0.000
Average schooling (years) 7.70 6.55 2,468,401 0.000
Proportion of men (%) 47.72 59.01 2,468,401 0.000
Location (%)
North 27.14 35.62 3,129,909 0.000
Algarve 4.86 5.23 3,129,909 0.522
Center 23.08 22.34 3,129,909 0.510
Lisbon 20.79 27.12 3,129,909 0.000
Alentejo 17.01 6.20 3,129,909 0.000
Azores 5.55 1.46 3,129,909 0.000
Madeira 1.57 2.03 3,129,909 0.169
Notes: The p-values refer to a test for signicance of mean di¤erences between coop-
eratives and capitalist rms. The data on worker attributes are missing in 2001.
The Table reveals rst of all that, on average, cooperatives operate in markets charac-
terised by higher levels of concentration, higher demand volatility, lower entry costs and
higher minimum e¢ cient scale than those populated by capitalist enterprises. These di¤er-
ences are all signicant at the 1% level but, given that collinearity is to be expected, we defer
any comments on the predictions from theory to the following section.
Second, it can be seen that there are signicant di¤erences in the internal attributes of the
type types of rm. Specically, cooperatives are, on average, older than capitalist enterprises
and operate with a larger, more highly educated and more productive workforce. The average
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age of a cooperative is just over 25 years compared with less than 9 years for the average
capitalist rm, and workers in the former have experienced, on average, one additional year
of schooling. It can also be seen that there is a marked di¤erence in gender make up of the
workforces, with females forming the majority in cooperatives (52%) but a minority (41%)
in capitalist enterprises.
The di¤erences in the scale of operation of the two types of rm are set out in detail in
Table 5.
Table 5: Firm size, 1995-2007
Coops. CFs
Number of employees
Mean 23 10
Median 8 3
Size distribution (%)
0-9 54.09 83.29
10-49 35.98 14.32
50-99 5.87 1.43
100+ 4.05 1.03
Annual revenue (millions of euros)
Mean 3.619 0.972
Median 0.350 0.116
Size distribution (%)
Less than 1 65.96 88.57
1-2 9.63 5.32
2-3 6.62 1.99
3+ 17.78 4.12
Total 14,370 3,115,539
We see from the table that cooperatives employed, on average, 24 workers, compared
with an average of just 10 in capitalist enterprises.17 The data also reveal the presence of a
signicant number of medium and large cooperatives: almost 6% of cooperatives employed
between 50 and 99 workers and a further 4% employed 100 or more. The corresponding
proportions for capitalist rms can be see to be appreciably lower. Table 5 also shows that
if size were to be measured by revenue rather than employment the di¤erential is even more
marked, with the average mean annual revenue in cooperatives being more than three and a
half times the capitalist rm gure.
This nding that cooperatives are capable of operating on a large scale is not new as
illustrated by the examples in the Introduction. Even in the case of worker cooperatives, which
17 If sole proprietorships were excluded, the mean for capitalist rms would rise to 13 and the median to 4.
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one might expect to face the most severe constraints on size, Dow (2003, p.47) reports the
existence of construction rms in Italy which employed about 3,000 workers and enterprises
in the Mondragon group employing 200-300 workers. Indeed, Ben-Ner (1988a) reports that,
in the 1980s, the mean employment level among Mondragon worker cooperatives exceeded
200 workers. We should note, however, that elsewhere the typical worker cooperative was
considerably smaller: 27 workers, on average, in France and 40 in Italy. More recently, Burdín
and Dean (2009) report that in Uruguay in 2005, the average worker cooperative employed
26 workers, which was almost twice the capitalist rm average.
3.3 Econometric evidence
We now examine the relationship between organisational form, rm attributes and industry
characteristics within a multivariate framework. Specically, we estimate the following logit
model:
Pr(yi;t = 1 j x) = G

sxsi;t; 
fxfi;t; Ds; Dr; Dt

where yi;t takes the value 1 if rmi is a cooperative and 0 if it is a capitalist rm, xsi;t is a set
of industry characteristics, xfi;t is a vector of rm characteristics, and Ds; Dr; Dt are sector,
region, and year dummies respectively.1819
Table 6 reports the estimates from the model, using pooled data for the years 1995-2007.
Column (1) presents the ndings of a basic specication which incorporates only the industry
variables and year xed e¤ects. Sector and region xed e¤ects, and then rm characteristics
are successively introduced into the model and the ndings reported in columns (2) - (5).
We begin with the industry variables and note, rst of all, that they are consistent in sign
across the specications and, with the single exception of the entry cost proxy in column (1),
signicant at the 1% level.
The market concentration variable attracts a positive coe¢ cient thus o¤ering support for
the arguments that market power is conducive to cooperatives The situation with regard to
risk appears to be more complex. On the one hand, the negative coe¢ cient on Entry costs
would appear to suggest that cooperatives o¤er less protection against risk than capitalist
enterprises whilst, on the other, the positive coe¢ cient on V olatility indicates that cooper-
atives perform relatively well in markets characterised by high levels of demand variability.
One possible explanation of these apparently contradictory ndings is that the Entry costs
18The sector dummies are dened at the CAE 1-letter level (NACE 2-digit level).
19Exploration of di¤erences in the regional distributions of the two types of rm is beyond the scope of
the present paper. For recent work in this area see Arando et al. (2012), Jones and Kalmi (2009) and Kalmi
(2012).
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variable might be picking up the e¤ect of the hypothesised di¤erence in the cost of raising
nance for the two types of rm as well as in their risk-spreading properties.
Table 6. Multivariate logit of Cooperatives on characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Industry characteristics
Volatility 1.509 1.431 1.495 1.822 1.819
(.106) (.110) (.111) (.122) (.126)
Entry costs -0.267 -1.062 -1.217 -1.797 -1.892
(.155) (.120) (.121) (.134) (.137)
Concentration (HHI) 2.465 1.627 1.655 1.439 1.390
(.143) (.158) (.159) (.186) (.195)
log of MES 0.461 0.510 0.507 0.287 0.295
(.029) (.024) (.024) (.031) (.032)
Firm characteristics
log of size - - - 0.182 0188
(.024) (.026)
Firm age - - - 0.137 0.141
(.005) (.005)
Firm age squared - - - -0.001 -0.001
(.0001) (.0001)
log of labour productivity - - - 0.080 0.062
(.029) (.030)
Average education - - - - 0.062
(.010)
Proportion of men - - - - - 0.881
(.085)
Year xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry xed e¤ects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional xed e¤ects No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,129,909 3, 129, 909 3, 129, 909 2,825,978 2,258,506
Notes: Signicance levels:  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%. Standard errors clustered at rm level.
The nal industry variable, MES, has a positive and signicant coe¢ cient even after
controlling individual rm size. One way to interpret this nding would be to argue, follow-
ing Audretsch and Mahmood (1995), that the greater the extent to which a rm is operating
below minimum e¢ cient scale, the greater will be its cost disadvantage. The positive coe¢ -
cient on MES after controlling for size would then indicate that cooperatives were at less of
a disadvantage than capitalist rms when operating at a suboptimal scale. However, we treat
theMES nding with caution, rst because of the inherent di¢ culty in measuring minimum
e¢ cient scale and, second, because our measure is based almost entirely on the capitalist
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enterprises within the sample.
Turning now to the rm attributes, all of the estimates are, in terms of sign, in line with the
simple summary statistics presented above. Thus we nd that, even in the presence of industry
and rm controls, the probability of a randomly selected rm being organised as a cooperative
is increasing in rm age and size, and the average educational level and productivity of its
workforce, and decreasing in the proportion of males among its employees. The nding on
productivity is consistent with a number of empirical studies (see, for example, Dow, 2003
and Maietta and Sena, 2010).20 In the following section we consider the implications of this
and the other rm attributes on rm survival.
4 Firm survival
We saw in the previous section that the average age of cooperatives was greater than that
of capitalist rms and that, even after controlling for a variety of rm and industry charac-
teristics, the probability of a randomly selected rm being organised as a cooperative was
increasing in the age of the rm.21 In this section we provide a detailed comparative analysis
of the survival prospects of the two organisational forms. We begin with a review of the
literature on rm survival, focussing on aspects which can be addressed using our data set.
Kaplan-Meier survival functions for cooperative and capitalist rms are presented in Section
4.2, which reveal that, at all age points, cooperatives are cumulatively more likely to have
survived than capitalist rms. In Section 4.3 we undertake a detailed investigation of the
probability of survival using a complementary log log proportional hazard model.
4.1 Literature review
As far as we are aware, the only theoretical arguments that explicitly address the survival
prospects of cooperatives relative to capitalist rms relate to the survival of the particular
organisational structure adopted by the enterprise rather than that of the production unit
itself. One line of argument is that by setting up a capitalist rm, an entrepreneur is able
to secure a larger share of the surplus than would be the case with a cooperative (see,
for example, Ben-Ner, 1988b). In certain circumstances, the establishment and entry of
the rm will, in itself, serve to consolidate the entrepreneurs position such that the future
prot stream could then be realised by through the sale of the rm. At this stage, the
20The ndings in Table 6 are robust to the use of an alternative estimation method (random-e¤ects logit)
which controls for rm unobserved heterogeneity in the panel dataset.
21The relationship is actually a quadratic. The probability of being a cooperative increases until the age
of 71 years and then declines.
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ownership structure might change to reect relative e¢ ciency and thus some capitalist rms
might become transformed into cooperatives.22 On the other hand, a prominent theme in
the literature on worker cooperatives concerns the possibility such rms might display a
tendency to "degenerate" into capitalist rms over time. The explanation is that there may
be an incentive for a successful cooperative - in which income per worker exceeds the market
wage - to replace any departing members with hired workers (Ben-Ner 1984, 1988b; Miyazaki
1984).23
The theoretical literature on rm survival more generally has focussed on the implications
of age and size. Jovanovic (1982) presents a model in which rms are uncertain about their
own e¢ ciency, but learn through experience in the market. A high level of output signals a
high level of relative e¢ ciency with the implication of a positive association between rm size
and the probability of survival. The age of the rm inuences survival in two ways. First, the
fact that experience enables the rm to estimate its cost of production with greater precision
serves, other things being equal, to raise the probability of survival. However, due to an
assumed convex relationship between expected future prot and expected relative e¢ ciency,
a rms expected future prot, for given e¢ ciency level, declines with the increased precision
with which e¢ ciency is estimated as the rm ages. This e¤ect on expected future prot
thereby generates a negative relationship between experience and survival and so the overall
e¤ect of age on survival cannot be signed a priori.24
Theoretical ambiguity also arises with regard to size once allowance is made for possible
changes in the external environment. Thus, using an entirely di¤erent theoretical framework,
Ghemawat and Nalebu¤ (1985) demonstrate that a large rm may have a greater incentive
than a small rm to exit from a declining industry.
There is a large empirical literature on rm survival including two papers, Ben-Ner (1988a)
and Pérotin (2004), with a specic focus on worker cooperatives. Ben-Ner estimated hazard
rates, conditioned on age, for worker cooperatives and capitalist rms in the UK over the
period 1974-86, and found that, at all age points, the cooperatives had a substantially lower
probability of demise than capitalist rms.25 Pérotin (2004), examined the fortunes of a
cohort of French enterprises over a period of up to 5 years from their formation in 1987.
She found that, except at age 3 where the probabilities of failure were broadly similar, the
22See Stewart (1984) for a model in which an entrepreneur uses capital precommitment as a device for
appropriating surplus and Hansmann (1996) for a discussion of owneship changes following entry. Hansmann
recognises that, in practice, there may be impediments to changes in ownership structure.
23See Dow (2003) for further theoretical discussion of transformations and Abramitzky (2008) for an analysis
of membership levels in the specic case of Israeli kibbutzim.
24See Dunne et al. (1989) and Pakes and Ericson (1998) for further discussion.
25Capitalist rm rates were based on data from 1974 to 1982. Ben-Ner noted that the result was not
sensitive to whether or not sole proprietorships were included in the set of capitalist rms.
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hazard rates of worker cooperatives were, once again, markedly below those of capitalist
rms; after four years, nearly 75% of the cooperatives remained in operation compared with
fewer than 60% of capitalist rms. Both papers also reveal a tendency for failure rates to
decline over time, although for worker cooperatives, the evidence suggests there may be an
initial phase of rising failure rates. Notwithstanding the theoretical ambiguities noted above,
the wider literature on rm survival strongly suggests that both age and size have a negative
impact on the probability of failure (see, for example, Agarwal and Gort (2002), Disney et al.
(2003), (Mata and Portugal (2002) and Tsoukas (2011)).26 Two other rm attributes that
are frequently included among the explanatory variables, and for which we have measures,
are productivity and the skill or educational level of the workforce. These variables have
similarly been found to have a negative e¤ect on rm and plant exit (Bandick and Görg,
2010, Bernard and Jensen, 2007, Mata and Portugal, 2002).
A number of empirical studies investigate the role played by industry characteristics
and, in fact, each of the industry attributes that we considered above in the context of the
distribution of cooperative activity has been considered as a potential determinant of the
likelihood of failure. Drawing on the work of Dunne et al. (1988, 1989), Bernard and Jensen
(2007) emphasise the role of sunk entry costs and nd, as expected, a signicant negative
relationship between their proxy measure and the probability of plant closure.
By contrast, no such clear-cut evidence has emerged with regard to demand volatility, min-
imum e¢ cient scale or market concentration. Agarwal and Gort (2002) argue that demand
volatility should increase failure rates but, in the absence of a direct measure of volatility,
rely on the distinction between consumer and producer industries as a simple proxy. This
proxy proves to be statistically insignicant.
The potential e¤ects of minimum e¢ cient scale and concentration are examined by Au-
dretsch (1991) and Mata and Portugal (2002). Audretsch, noting the practical di¢ culty of
measuring minimum e¢ cient scale, constructs a proxy based on an approach suggested by
Comanor and Wilson (1967). Mixed results were obtained, with the coe¢ cient changing sign
depending on the period of survival under consideration. Mata and Portugal (2002), employ-
ing the proxy suggested by Lyons (1980), found a signicant positive relationship between
minimum e¢ cient scale and the probability of failure. The argument given by Audretsch for
including market concentration among the set of regressors is that, to the extent that high
concentration leads to high price-cost margins, it increases the survival prospects of those
rms, typically new entrants, which are operating at a sub-optimal scale. Once again how-
26Studies of establishment or plant survival similarly nd that age and size increases the chance of survival
(see, for example, Bernard and Jensen, 2007 and Bandick and Görg, 2010). Disney et al. (2003) present
results both for independent establishments and those which form part of a group under common ownership.
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ever, the available evidence does not o¤er strong support. Audretsch (1991) reports a positive
and signicant coe¢ cient only when survival is measured over a short period following entry,
whilst Mata and Portugal (2002) fail to detect a signicant relationship.
4.2 Empirical results
We begin our analysis of rm survival by presenting, in Figure 1, Kaplan-Meier survival
functions for all cooperatives and capitalist enterprises which were present in the data set at
any time between 1995 and 2007. We are able to include rms that were created prior to
1995 as a rms date of creation is collected as part of the census. The lifespan of each rm
was computed as the di¤erence between the last year that the rm was observed in the data
set and the year the rm was constituted as reported in the data. Our interest here is in the
survival of a production unit with a specic organisational form. All rms that changed legal
status were therefore excluded from the survival analysis. In practice, almost all exits were
due to dissolution; conversions accounted for only 6% of total cooperative failures and for a
negligibly small proportion of capitalist rm failures.27
The survival functions show the percentage of rms of each type in the sample that had
survived to, or beyond, the specied ages.
The gure reveals a clear di¤erence in the lifespans of the two types of rms, which
comes as no surprise given the earlier nding on the average age of the rms. It can be
seen that, at every age point, cooperatives have a higher cumulative probability of survival.
Approximately 97% of cooperatives in the sample had survived for 5 years or more, 84%
had survived for 20 years or more and 63% had existed for 50 years or more. For capitalist
enterprises the respective gures are approximately 80%, 45% and 20%. It should be noted
that the, perhaps surprisingly, long lifespans for enterprises of both types reects the fact
that the Kaplan-Meier methodology corrects for right censoring but not left censoring within
the data; long-lived rms are over-represented.
To determine the factors underlying these di¤erences, we estimated the following comple-
mentary log-log hazard model:28
hi;t = h0(t) exp(
0Z(t))
27Our interest lies in the distinction between cooperatives and capitalist rms and so a change in status
from sole proprietorship to company, or vice versa, is not regarded as a transformation.
28The cloglog model has been used by Bandick and Görg (2010) and Tsoukas (2011) and, as a discrete time
version of the Cox proportional hazards model, is appropriate for the analysis of annual data. The underlying
assumption of proportional hazard models is that the hazard depends only on the time at risk - the baseline
hazard - and on explanatory variables a¤ecting the hazard independently of time.
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Figure 1: Kaplan-Meier survival estimates
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where hi;t is the probability that rm i exits between dates t and t + 1, t is the time since
entry, h0(t) is the baseline hazard and Z is a vector of explanatory variables.
The model was estimated using the full sample as above and the results are reported in
Table 7. Note the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the rm exits and 0 otherwise.
In column (1) we report the estimated e¤ect of cooperative ownership on the probability of
failure, controlling only for the year of observation. As would be expected from ndings in
Figure 1, the coe¢ cient is both negative and signicant at the 1% level.
In columns (2) and (3) the four industry variables along with sector xed e¤ects and, in the
case of column (3) regional xed e¤ects, are introduced alongside the dummy for cooperative
ownership.29 This has the e¤ect of reducing the magnitude of the coe¢ cient on Coop, but
only by a modest amount. As far as the industry variables themselves are concerned, all are
signicant with the positive coe¢ cients on Concentration and V olatility, and the negative
coe¢ cient on Entry costs, conforming to a priori expectations and, in the latter case, the
ndings of Bernard and Jensen (2007). The role of minimum e¢ cient scale is discussed below
in the context of the rm attributes.
Columns (4) and (5) present the ndings when the individual rm attributes are added,
in two stages, to the specication. These two sets of results are very similar to each other
29Bernard and Jensen (2007) similarly include regional xed e¤ects in their examination of manufacturing
plant closures.
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and we therefore restrict attention on the estimates from the full specication reported in
column (5).
The rst point to note is that whilst the inclusion of the rm attributes has the e¤ect
of further reducing the magnitude of the coe¢ cient on Coop, it remains negative and highly
signicant. This represents the main nding to emerge from the hazard estimation.
Table 8. Determinants of Cooperative survival
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Coop -0.848 -0.711 -0.712 -0.234 -0.260
(.048) (.048) (.049) (.052) (.060)
Industry characteristics
Volatility - 0.450 0.445 0.616 0.725
(.020) (.020) (021) (.025)
Entry costs - -0.831 -0.834 -0.705 -0.505
(.028) (.028) (.031) (.037)
Concentration (HHI) - - 0.235 -0.213 -0.186 -0.275
(.035) (.035) (.037) (.045)
log of MES - -0.177 -0.174 0.088 0.098
(.003) (.003) (.004) (.005)
Firm characteristics
log of size - - - - 0.683 -0.634
(.003) (.004)
Firm age - - - -0.023 -0.020
(.0005) (.0005)
Firm age squared - - - 0.000 0.000
(8.57e-06) (8.31e-06)
log of labour productivity - - - - 0.152 - 0.159
(.003) (.003)
Average education - - - - 0.021
(.001)
Proportion of men - - - - -1.388
(.007)
Year xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry xed e¤ects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional xed e¤ects No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,692,505 2,692,505 2,692,505 2,415,713 1,896,373
Notes: Signicance levels:  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%. Standard errors clustered at rm level.
Regarding the internal rm attributes themselves, the negative coe¢ cients on age, size
and productivity are consistent with the existing literature. It can also be seen that, once
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conditioned on rm size, the coe¢ cient on minimum e¢ cient scale has the expected positive
sign. The estimates also point to a positive relationship between the average education of the
workforce and the probability of failure, which is contrary to expectations, and to a negative
association between the proportion of males and the probability of failure.
The main message to emerge, however, is that the earlier ndings of Ben-Ner (1988a)
and Pérotin (2004) on the superior survival prospects of worker cooperatives over capitalist
enterprises also holds for cooperatives more generally. Furthermore, we have been able to
demonstrate that di¤erences in industry and rm characteristics account for some, but not
all, of the superior performance of cooperatives in this respect.30
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have drawn on a comprehensive data set from Portugal to provide a detailed
comparison of cooperative and capitalist modes of production. More specically, we investi-
gated the patterns of activity undertaken by cooperatives and capitalist rms, their scale of
activity and internal characteristics, and ability to survive in the market.
The main ndings of the paper are rst, that there are signicant di¤erences in the
industrial distribution of the two types of rm and that these di¤erences reect variations in
market power and risk across industries. We found strong evidence in support of Hansmanns
(1996) argument that cooperatives are attracted to markets with high levels of market power.
The situation with regard to risk is less straightforward: cooperatives were less likely to be
found in industries characterised by high entry costs, but were not deterred by high levels
of demand volatility. In fact, the results point to a positive relationship between demand
volatility and cooperative presence. These industry-level ndings complement the work of
Jones and Kalmi (2009) which focussed on the geographic distribution of cooperatives and
found, at a country level, a positive relationship between the level of interpersonal trust and
the presence of cooperatives.
Second, there were marked di¤erences in the characteristics of the two types of rm.
Cooperatives were typically older and larger, employing on average 24 workers compared with
10 workers in capitalist rms. Workers in cooperatives tended to be more highly educated
and productive than their counterparts in capitalist rms.
Finally, we demonstrated that cooperatives enjoyed a higher probability of survival than
30The ndings in Table 7 are robust to the use of an alternative estimation method (random-e¤ects logit)
which controls for rm unobserved heterogeneity in the panel dataset. We also estimated equations using
a restricted sample comprising only those rms that entered the market during the period 1995-2007. This
yielded qualitatively similar results except that the inclusion of the rm attributes led to a loss of signicance
of the coe¢ cients on Coops and log MES. The signs on these coe¢ cients were not a¤ected.
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capitalist enterprises. In part this was due to di¤erences between the rms in their industry
distribution, age, size and other internal characteristics. However, even after controlling for
these factors, cooperatives were found to have a higher probability of survival. Whether the
explanation is simply that the costs that closure would generate for one of the classes of
patrons - workers, consumers or suppliers - are internalised within a cooperative, or there are
more complex factors involved, constitutes an interesting topic for further research.
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